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Abstract
Computer users have depended on email communication since its advent. This
dependency has created an increased level of system trust within email systems.
Individuals can verify where an email came from and who sent the email by simply
looking at the senders’ email address. The sender’s email address can be hidden from
unsuspecting individuals who do not know how to verify an email address and from
individuals too hurried to pay close enough attention to the email address. This system
trust relationship can be broken when senders deceive receivers into believing senders are
someone they are not. This type of deception is called email forgery and is a form of
identity theft. This research describes the results of a field experiment which examines
the effects of warnings on system trust and individual awareness in government computer
systems through the use of email forgery. The experiment consisted of forging a trusted
government email account and trying to get government computer users to reply to the
forged email address. The results revealed that warning individuals about possible email
forgery did not increase their awareness or reduce their level of system trust in the email
system nor did it increase their ability to detect email forgery. The results did determine
that government computer users are extremely vulnerable to email forgery and that new
security measures need to be adapted to protect these systems from this type of threat.
The use of authentication by the email sender through the use of the new common access
card (i.e., smart card or CAC) by the military is one possible measure introduced by this
research to protect these systems from this form of vulnerability.
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DECEPTION DETECTION: STUDY OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION
THROUGH ELECTRONIC IDENTITY THEFT – EMAIL FORGERY IN THE U.S
MILITARY
I. Introduction
Background
The number of computers and information systems has grown exponentially since
their beginnings in the latter part of the 20th century. Moore’s Law claims that
“computing technology advancement doubles every 18 months” (Moore, 2002). Of
particular interest in the past several years is the explosive growth of communications,
taking the world from isolated mainframes and microcomputers to global
interconnectedness. Long gone are the days of the single-minded use of computers as
large calculators only; it could be argued their primary purpose in today’s networked
world is communication. We have seen email communication grow from less then 100
million mailboxes before 1996 to over 800 million mailboxes in 2001 (Fontana, 2001).
Email communication will only continue to grow, and with that growth, new
vulnerabilities and threats to email and its users will grow as well. People will not only
be able to hear a person’s voice with clarity through voice-email and instant voice over
internet protocol (VOIP), but also through internet video conferencing where they will be
able to see the individual they are speaking with, as if the person were standing in front of
them. This type of communication technology brings many opportunities and services
that have not been available in the past. It also brings many opportunities for deceit and
manipulation of these new communication methods. Criminals of the future will find
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new ways to deceive, steal, destroy, and manipulate in order to accomplish their criminal
activities. We must look at these new communication tools and find new ways to defend
them from such forms of illicit activity. The United States’ dependence on information
systems prompted former President Clinton to issue an Executive Order establishing a
commission on critical information protection. This commission was charged with the
responsibility of finding vulnerabilities that lie within the U.S.’s critical information
systems infrastructure. The study found increasing reliance on critical information
systems and decreased awareness to vulnerabilities within these systems. This study also
found the number of threats and vulnerabilities to these systems to be increasing
(Denning,1999). These new threats and vulnerabilities to our computers and
communications systems must be made secure by those who protect these systems to
prevent criminals from exploiting them.
As the U.S. and the world become more technologically advanced and
information systems become more commonplace in society, the level of trust in those
systems and technology will increase (Wickens, 1999). This increasing reliance or trust
in automated systems has led researchers to study the many aspects of human-machine
interaction (Parasuraman, 1987; Murray and Caldwell, 1999; Wickens, 1999). These
studies found the more an individual works with a system and experiences successful use
with that system, their level of system trust increases. System trust defined for the
purposes of this research is “the level of trust a user places in a computer system to
perform the task it was designed to perform.” System awareness is defined then “as the
level of attentiveness a user has in the computer system to identify when the computer
system does not perform as it should.” This research focuses on human-machine trust in
2

government email communication systems and attempts to determine if system trust
increases with successful uses of that system. It also attempts to determine if there is a
relationship between an individual’s system awareness and system trust. The final and
most important focus of this research is to determine if email forgery, a form of identity
theft, is a vulnerability the U.S. military needs to be aware of. If government email
systems are vulnerable to email forgery, then terrorists and criminals have a means to
manipulate military members.

Research Applicability to the United States Air Force
Computer users have depended on email communication since its advent. This
dependency has created an increased level of system trust within email systems.
Individuals can verify where an email came from and who sent the email by simply
looking at the sender’s email address. The sender’s email address can be hidden from
unsuspecting individuals who do not know how to verify an email address and from
individuals too hurried to pay close enough attention to the email address. This system
trust relationship can be broken when the senders deceive receivers into believing senders
are someone they are not. Identity theft is a rapidly growing crime within the U.S. with
over 900,000 new victims each year (Frank, 1998). Computers and the Internet have
given this form of crime an area in which to operate. With the increase in this type of
crime and the dependency on email communication, we need to ask how do stolen
identities and false orders affect the U.S. Air Force and DoD?
The Air Force and DoD rely heavily on email. Air Force commanders send
orders for their troops to carry out through email. Air Force instructors use email as a
3

primary means of communication to issue assignments or inform students of class and
course changes. Stealing an individual’s identity is not difficult (Frank, 1998). Getting
the receiver to trust the information the sender is sending is also not difficult. In face-toface communication, a sender communicates a message by using a number of verbal and
non-verbal cues. The receiver must interpret these cues in order to determine if the
message has any truth to it. With email and any form of non-face-to-face
communication, the receiver has to interpret the truth with only verbal cues. Those
verbal cues are reduced even further because there is no actual voice communication.
Email is primarily text-based. As such, it reduces the number of processes the receiver
must interpret and allows less opportunity to detect false messages. An email sender can
potentially gain the necessary communication (verbal) cues needed to defraud the
receiver with only one email from an account/individual from which they have stolen an
identity. If this is true and false orders are given and followed through with, what can
prevent this type of deception? Can warnings about this type of deception increase a
receiver’s awareness and improve their ability to identify this type of deception? The Air
Force Office of Scientific Research has funded deception detection research to answer the
following questions: “1) How can receivers be assured of the reliability and accuracy of
information and its source? 2) How can they know when to trust the information? 3) Are
personnel likely to question the accuracy before relying on information to make decisions
vital to our national interest?” (Research Consortium, 2001) This thesis research seeks to
provide information on how these questions can be answered in the realm of email
communication systems. It also seeks to add to the body of knowledge to further the
research in deception detection using information systems.
4

Problem Statement and Purpose of Research
This thesis research looks at this new form of computer communication deception
called e-mail forgery and attempts to show how easy it can be to deceive and manipulate
individuals with only a small amount of information about the sender. E-mail forgery is a
form of electronic identity theft in which the sender attempts to deceive the receiver into
believing the sender is someone other than the person the receiver believes them to be.
One of the purposes of this research is to determine if warnings about possible email
forgeries are an appropriate method of raising an individual’s awareness in detecting
electronic types of deception through text-based communication methods. Biros, George,
& Zmud (2002) found warnings increased an individual’s ability to detect deception, but
that it also increased his/her sensitivity to false alarms (judging true messages as
deceptive). The scope of this research is to determine; 1) if warnings in deception
detection improve an individual’s ability to identify email forgeries, 2) ways to improve
awareness in deception detection, and 3) if email forgery is a significant vulnerability the
U.S. Air Force and DoD need to be concerned about.

Summary
The information age has provided an array of exciting opportunities in technology
and communication. These opportunities are not without their negative impacts, such as
the number of viruses spreading across the World Wide Web and email systems
(Denning, 1999). The increase in frauds and crimes are in direct connection to these
technological advances (Robb, 2002). The U.S. Air Force and DoD must not become
complacent and allow these vulnerabilities to jeopardize our information superiority over
5

our foes. The U.S. must stay on the cutting edge of technology, but remember that with
this technology come new vulnerabilities our enemies are more than willing and ready to
exploit. Therefore, the U.S. must stay vigilant and determine what these vulnerabilities
are before our adversaries have an opportunity to exploit them. The U.S. cannot allow
new types of vulnerabilities to go undefended or unprotected in the future. Therefore, we
must look at these new communication tools and find new ways to detect and defend our
information infrastructure from all forms of illicit activity. Leaders and military
organizations need to know what their computer vulnerabilities are. This research
identifies a new vulnerability, email forgery, that leaders and military organizations need
to be made aware of. This research will provide empirical evidence that military users
are susceptible to email forgery and attempts to determine if warnings provide a way to
increase users’ awareness and ability to detect this form of deception. If military email is
susceptible to email forgery is it possible false orders could be issued and acted upon in a
battlefield environment?

Thesis Organization
The following chapters present support for a conceptual framework that will be
used to observe: 1) an individual’s trust and awareness in an information systems
automation environment, 2) if warnings increase an individual’s ability to detect
deception, and 3) if email forgery is a significant vulnerability to government email
systems.
Chapter II presents a literature review of the body of knowledge on deception,
trust, information warfare, identity theft, and email forgery. Chapter III presents the
6

experimental and methodological framework for the experiment used to test the
hypothesis. Chapter IV presents the statistical analysis of the data collected from the
experiment. Finally, Chapter V presents the research findings and conclusions.

7

II. Literature Review
The Nature of Deception
Deceit has existed since the first man walked on the earth. “The man said ‘the
woman you put here with me she gave me some fruit from the tree, and I ate it.’ Then the
Lord God said to the woman, ‘What is this you have done?’ The woman said, ‘the
serpent deceived me and I ate’” (Genesis 3:12-13, Quest Study Bible, NIV, 1994). Ever
since, deceit has driven men and women to manipulate others to attain their desires.
Miriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (Webster’s) definition of deceit is “to cause to
accept as true or valid what is false or invalid” (Webster’s, 2002). “Mislead,” a common
synonym for “deceive,” is defined as “to lead in a wrong direction or into a mistaken
action or belief often by deliberate deceit” (Webster’s, 2002). It can be presumed that the
“detection” (defined as “to discover the true character of” (Webster’s, 2002)) of deceit
came into existence shortly after Adam and Eve’s first deception, and that since then a
struggle has ensued to perfect means and methods of both deception and detection.
Defining deception is difficult because people interpret deception in many
different ways. For example, Buller and Burgoon (1996:205) state that deception “occurs
when communicators control the information contained in their messages to convey a
meaning that departs from the truth as they know it.” They claim that this interpretation
rules out any form of mistaken or unintended lies. Although their definition closely
follows Webster’s definition, the difference lies in “intent to deceive.” Buller and
Burgoon (1996:209) argue that deception occurs only when the sender purposely tries to
deceive the receiver; therefore, deception can take place only on the part of the sender.
The receiver is a mere victim of the sender’s deception. They also argue that suspicion
8

occurs when a receiver holds a belief without evidence that the sender’s actions are
dubious. Another definition of deception is “a lie or deceit when one person intends to
mislead another, doing so deliberately, without prior notification of this purpose and
without having been explicitly asked to do so by the target” (Ekman, 1985:28). O’Hair
and Cody (1994:182), describe deception as “the conscious attempt to create or
perpetuate false impressions among other communicators.” Their definition focuses
more on the communication strategy rather than changing of the receiver’s understanding
or beliefs. Further, they view the mere attempt of deception, whether successful or not,
as deception. Again, however, the focus is on the intent to deceive or mislead another
person and appears to be most researchers’ central theme when defining deceit or
deception.

Types of Deception
This section will provide a sampling of the deception etiology which is intended
to illustrate the complexity of both the subject and scope of deception detection. Ekman
(1985:44) identified two types of deception: falsification and concealment. He defines
falsification as “masking true information by transmitting false information,” and
concealment as “one person keeping the truth from another person or groups of people in
an attempt to cause them to believe something that is not true.” Turner, Edgley, and
Olmstead (1975:75) defined five types of deception: lies, exaggerations, half-truths,
secrets, and diversionary responses. Lies are acts that falsify the truth by providing false
information to what the receiver believes to be true. Exaggerations are acts that afford
more information or go beyond what the truth calls for. Half-truths occur when the
9

sender withholds parts of the information from the receiver in an attempt to minimize the
effect of the whole truth. Secrets are a form of withholding or keeping silent about
information the receiver wants or may need. Diversionary responses occur when the
sender redirects the discussion to another topic area to avoid telling the truth or a lie.
However, O’Hair and Cody (1994:185) claim their five categories of deception allow for
greater latitude in behavioral and moralistic features than Turner et al.’s five deception
types. Their categories are lies, evasion, overstatement, concealment, and collusion. Lies
represent direct acts of fabrication intending to create a belief by the receiver that is not
the truth. Evasion is defined as behavior intended to redirect communication away from
certain topics. Overstatements are acts intended to exaggerate what is known to be true.
Concealment is an attempt to hide true feelings or emotions from the receiver. Collusion
is a form of deception where the sender and the receiver cooperate, at least initially, in
allowing the deception to take place. Even though O’Hair and Cody claim their
categories offer “greater latitude,” from the Turner et al. (1975) types, we observe little or
no difference in their respective definitions; it appears the differences are in name alone.
Metts’ (1989:165) research on “the form and function of deception in close relationships”
found three basic lie types: falsifications, distortions, and omissions. A falsification is
stating information that is not true and clearly refuting the legitimacy of the true
information. Distortion is manipulation of the true information through exaggeration,
minimization, and equivocation, so that the receiver would not know all the facets of the
truth or would misconstrue the information provided. Omission is keeping all
information from the receiver. However, this research does not intend to take issue the
various deception nomenclatures and subdivided definitions found in the literature; the
10

intent is simply to show the numerous forms of deception which are believed to exist
within the body of knowledge on deception. The complexity of the deception area of
research was summed up well by McCornack who stated, “Messages involving
fundamentally different types of information manipulation cannot be conceptualized as
similar and treated methodologically as identical” (1992:2). The above discussion on the
deception etiology allows this research to infer that deception involves messages and
information intentionally communicated to produce a false conclusion. The etiology can
be seen in Figure 1.
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Interpersonal Deception Theory
Buller and Burgoon (1996:205) define interpersonal deception theory (IDT) “as a
merger of interpersonal communication and deception principles designed to better
account for deception in interactive contexts.” To understand IDT, the terms
“interpersonal” and “interactive” must be defined. Deception and suspicion are defined
previously. Interpersonal communication is the exchange of communication, which takes
place between two or more people. Interactive communication is the synchronous
communication exchange in which immediate feedback is necessary. So IDT is a “theory
of deception and reactions to actual or perceived deceptions” (Buller and Burgoon,
1996:212). IDT is a dynamic communication activity between the sender and the
receiver or a face-to-face communication exchange. IDT involves verbal and non-verbal
communication. It involves strategic and non-strategic behaviors. It is goal-oriented and
egotistic. O’Hair and Cody (1994:195) believe that egoism is the root of why people are
deceptive. They define egoism “as a self-directed motive employing deceptive strategies
intended to protect, preserve, or promote the self-concept or self-esteem of the deceiver
(sender)” (O’Hair and Cody, 1994:195). Egoism implies that deception is strategic.
Strategic interpersonal communication is a highly conscious, planned activity. Nonstrategic interpersonal communication is unintentional and often unconscious behavior.
Neither the sender nor the receiver is a passive observer of the other’s actions. What IDT
claims is deception can be detected by looking at strategic and non-strategic behaviors.
For example, senders, when lying, might be nervous or they might roll their hair with
their finger. These would be non-verbal deceptive cues associated with the sender trying
to provide a false statement. Although IDT is primarily associated with the receiver’s
13

ability to identify non-verbal cues, IDT applies to this research in a non-interactive,
strategic way. This research will look at a planned (strategic) attempt to deceive the
receiver in a non-interactive way using an automated text-based communication method.
There is no immediate feedback (non-interactive) rather it is a delayed feedback approach
with the use of computer-mediated communication – email.
Associated with the cognitive demands of IDT are norms or expectations, which
are held by both the sender and receiver. Truth-bias (discussed in detail later in this
chapter) is present when two people engage in interpersonal communication and what is
said is believed or expected to be true (McCornack and Parks, 1986). Buller and
Burgoon (1996:209) claim, “Trust is the foundation on which enduring relationships are
built, and trust grows with the belief that another is communicating in an honest,
straightforward manner.” Here is where deception becomes apparent. When participants
recognize that a violation of this truth-biased expectation occurs, when the common bond
of truth-bias is broken, deception begins.

Information Manipulation Theory
Since the time we were children, we have devised ways to divert from the truth to
avoid trouble or confrontation. It is human nature to want to avoid trouble or
confrontation whether it is intentional or unintentional. “Individuals frequently are
confronted with situations in which they must reconcile the competing goals of
conveying information that their conversational partners are entitled to have and
minimizing the damage that conveying that information might cause” (McCornack,
1992:6). One way to merge these competing goals is to change the information presented
14

or withhold key information from the communication exchange. For example, when a
parent or guardian asks a teenager, “Did you go to school today?” The teenager
responds, “Why yes of course.” The teenager did in fact go to the school. At the same
time, the teenager may havewithheld the fact they did not stay. Another example of
withholding information in order to deceive and avoid confrontation occurs when a
spouse asks, “How do I look? I don’t look fat in this do I?” The other spouse replies,
“No you look great!” The spouse in reality thinks the other spouse looks very corpulent
in the outfit. Many other examples of deception or manipulation exist. Information
Manipulation Theory (IMT) is rooted in the situations described above. Deceptive
messages mislead receivers through covertly breaching the ideologies that steer and
direct conversational comprehension (Bowers, Elliot, & Desmond, 1977:237).
Deceptiveness takes many forms. IMT focuses on the varying amount of information
that is presented, the distortion of the information, the use of typically vague and unclear
phrases, and/or varying the relevance of the information presented (McCornack, 1992:4).
IMT is rooted in the conversational maxims of Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle
(CP). The CP claims that during conversations, people usually hold to unwritten
conversational maxims. Truth bias ascertains that individuals enter into a trust
relationship when communication takes place and that all pertinent information will be
presented in a truthful manner (McCornack and Parks, 1986). Only when this trust
relationship is broken does deception occur. According to Grice (1975:45),
communication is made possible by these maxims where the communicators mutually
agree to general principles of cooperation and rationality. Grice offers four
conversational maxims, which exist within the CP.
15

These maxims are quantity, quality,

relation, and manner. IMT builds on these maxims and claims that when these maxims
are violated this can be considered a deviation from the rational and cooperative behavior
(Biros, 1998).
Quantity. Refers to the amount of information required to communicate between
the sender and the receiver. The amount of information presented should be no more
than is required for the situation. A violation of this maxim would be to leave out
information, which is necessary or add information, which is unnecessary.
Quality. Refers to the genuineness of the information presented within a message.
This is a fundamental aspect of “truth bias.” “To call on speakers to avoid falsehood and
to have support for what they say” (Jacobs, Dawson, & Brashers, 1996:71). “Participants
are expected not to present information they know to be false, nor make claims for which
they lack adequate evidence” (McCornack, 1992:5). To provide false information
knowingly, would be a violation of this maxim.
Relation. Refers to the relevance of information within communication contexts.
A violation of this maxim would be to redirect the communication to another subject.
This would be the ability to step around a subject without discussing it. An example of
this is what is coined “tap-dancing.” One is said to be a tap-dancing when one is trying
to portray knowledge of a subject when none exists; the speaker steps around a subject.
“Avoidance” is the key to the violation of this maxim.
Manner. Refers to how the information is presented or clarity. “Manner refers to
how things should be said rather than to what should be said--avoid obscurity and
ambiguity; be brief and orderly” (Jacobs et al., 1996:71). In one word, “clear.” The
previous three maxims existed because of what information is said or provided. This
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maxim exists because of how information is said or provided. If information is presented
in a sarcastic or jokingly manner it can shape how an individual perceives that
information.
Given that individuals have certain expectations concerning information quality,
quantity, relevance, and manner, it is a possibility for senders to abuse one or more of
these maxims when trying to deceive receivers (McCornack, 1992:5). IMT and
deception are founded in the violation of one or more of these CP maxims. “Messages
that are commonly thought of as deceptive derive from covert violations of the
conversational maxims” (McCornack, 1992:5). So IMT is, “Given that conversational
interactants possess assumptions regarding the quantity, quality, manner, and relevance
of information that should be presented, it is possible for speakers to exploit any or all of
these assumptions by manipulating the information that they possess so as to mislead
listeners” (McCornack, 1992:5). IMT focuses on the verbal context of communication,
whereas IDT has a heavy emphasis on non-verbal communication methods. They are
both critical to the research in deception and its detection. Deception takes many forms
as can be seen from both of these theories and the numerous types of deception defined
previously. This research will focus on information systems as the platform for
communication, which have a heavy reliance on text-based communication. Therefore
non-verbal communication does not have a role in this research other then to present the
theory and show its importance on deception and deception detection in the
communication process. IMT will play a significant role, since it is rooted in verbal and
text-based communication.
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Trust and Truth-bias
In order to understand deception thoroughly, one must understand the concept of
trust and the theory of truth-bias. Webster’s (2002) defines trust as “[an] assured
reliance on the character, ability, strength, or truth of someone or something; one in
which confidence is placed.” If the Bible is viewed as historical reference, then trust has
existed since the beginning of time, even before deception. According to the Book of
Genesis, God trusted Adam and Eve to care for the Garden of Eden and to not eat from
the Tree of Life. That trust was broken when the serpent deceived Eve and caused both
Adam and Eve to eat the forbidden fruit (Genesis 3, Quest Study Bible, NIV, 1994).
Hence, for deception to take place, trust must first be established. Trust is based on
credibility, or how believable a person or system is, and is the fundamental basis on
which long-lasting relationships are constructed (Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992:328).
Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher, termed this concept ethos. Credibility refers to
a collection of judgments that receivers make about the believability of a sender (Buller
and Burgoon, 1996:207). Trust grows with time and the basic belief that others are
communicating in an honest, straightforward manner (Buller and Burgoon, 1996:208).
The truth-bias theory states it is in people’s nature to trust their fellow humans unless
they have information that negates that trust (McCornack and Parks, 1986; Levine and
McCornack, 1992; Stiff et al., 1992; Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Burgoon, Buller,
Guerrero, Afifi, & Feldman, 1996). Stated another way, truth bias is a social interaction
expectation stemming from the norm of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960:167). Researchers
have concluded that our social relationships rely on the exchange of aid, help, and
rewards to satisfy one another’s needs (Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Greenburg, 1980;
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Roloff, 1987), and that we embrace the social norm expectation that others are decent,
pleasant, and worthy of positive regard (Kellerman, 1984:44). The concept of truth bias
was extended by Muir to encompass not only human-to-human interaction, but also
human-to-machine and human-to-system interactions (Muir, 1994:1912). She concludes
further that truth bias, like trust, matures and is made significantly stronger over time.
For example, in today's society of seemingly instant computer-based communication to
almost anyplace in the world, individuals have a certain level of trust in the systems they
use. The level of trust depends on length of experience with the system and system
performance over periods of time (Moray, Hiskes, Lee, & Muir, 1995:185).
While trust may or may not be an endogenous trait (the question of which is
beyond the scope of this paper), there is little doubt that the level of trust is learned or
developed. For instance, a new computer user using electronic mail (email) may be
dubious of the email process; although they would seem to exhibit some level of trust (as
evidenced by simply using email to begin with), they may doubt the delivery will take
place in a secure and timely manner. In fact, the doubter might even call the intended
recipient to verify delivery. Veteran email-users have probably developed trust in their
email system. Why? Likely, their trust level has built up over time with repeated
successful experiences—they have faith in the system because it worked in the past. For
example, when we turn on a light switch, we expect the light to come on. We do not
think about the electrical-mechanical process when the switch is turned on; we simply
know through experience that, in the past, the light came on, so we expect it to come on
again each time we turn on the switch. Hence, trust level is based on performance or
experience over time, and leads to development of truth bias. Levine and McCornack
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(1992:144) empirically tested truth bias and determined it to be a significant social norm
in deception research. The truth bias proved by McCornack and Parks (1986:388),
Levine and McCornack (1992:144), and Stiff et al., (1992:327) was based on human-tohuman interaction, but Muir (1994:1912) makes the point that this model holds true for
human-to-machine or human-to-system trust as well. If this same email system failed to
deliver the message to the sender, perhaps only once or even repeatedly, then the user’s
trust in the email system would decrease. At a higher level, computer system use should
also decrease if the computer system becomes an unreliable system. This research does
not attempt to define what a user might perceive as an “unreliable system” except that in
some manner the computer system fails to meet the user’s expectations. As for the
human-to-machine interface, a machine can be just about anything from a watch to a
microwave to a computer system. Muir (1994:1913) stated that human trust in machines
would grow with their experience with usage of the machine over time. This concept or
model is derived from McCornack and Parks’ (1986:388) human-to-human trust
relationships. Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock (1991a), Buller, Strzyzewski, &
Hunsaker (1991b), and Stiff et al. (1992) present the view that as relationships develop,
trust in those relationships becomes stronger; over time, people tend to move toward the
simple decision heuristic that it is easier to trust than it is to perceive deceit in the
communication. This same heuristic can be applied to human-to-system and human-tomachine trust (Moray et al., 1995:191). Hence, because a user’s level of trust (or faith)
has been established and grown through successful past uses, it is easier for the user to
trust that continued successful communications will occur in the present than it is to
attempt to detect deception.
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Aroused Suspicion
Suspicion is one dynamic that may serve to offset this truth bias heuristic and
decrease trust in the situation. Stiff et al. (1992) state that relationships of trust with welldeveloped truth bias, whether human-to-human or human-to-system, are not likely to
become suspicious on their own. A third party (i.e., person, message, or signal) must
introduce some form of deception to cause suspicion in those well-developed trust
relationships. This information would increase awareness and impact these judgments of
truthfulness. For example, a professor and student have a certain level of trust
expectation in their relationship. The professor expects the student to do their own work.
The student trusts the professor to present honest and correct information. This trust
relationship is established until some third party information is introduced (i.e., cheating
on a test by the student or incorrect information presented by the professor) that causes
the professor or student to no longer place trust in that relationship. This trust in
something or someone is what causes an individual to miss a deceptive message from a
sender where a truth bias exists. Another example is email received from a trusted
sender. Presumably, the user opens and reads the email with little or no suspicion of
deceptive activity. The receiver trusts the sender not to deceive them or send them an
email with malicious logic inserted (i.e., a virus). Now suppose a third-party warning is
introduced. For example, information is received alerting all users that any email with a
certain subject line introduces a damaging virus. This warning email should arouse
suspicion in the receiver, causing him or her to be aware of this particular form of
deceptive message, even if received from a trusted sender using a trusted email address.
Hence, since suspicion is now introduced (or perhaps awareness heightened to an
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unacceptable level from a previous minimally acceptable level), there is cause for the
truth bias norm to be questioned. This is in direct agreement with what Stiff et al.
(1992:330) found in their research. They claim the truth bias heuristic serves to increase
judgments of truthfulness, unless aroused suspicion by a third party to the receiver,
offsets this bias, producing greater judgments of deceptiveness.

Human Trust in Computer Systems (Artifacts)
Deception of computer- and communications-based information systems is a
major security concern for the Air Force. Zmud describes information transiting these
types of systems “artifact-based communication” (Zmud, 1990:97). Since 1990, artifactbased communication has grown exponentially in concert with the rapid growth of use of
the Internet and the World Wide Web. In fact, we speculate that artifact-based
communication (via Information Systems (IS) or Information Technology (IT)) is
expanding more rapidly than any other form of communication method ever has before.
Zmud appears prophetic as he claimed in 1990 the following would occur as artifactbased communications developed:
•
•
•
•

People would become increasingly dependent upon IS.
People’s confidence in information received from IS would increase.
Deceptive manipulation would increase via IS communication channels.
Perpetrators of deceptive behavior would be more difficult to identify (Zmud 1990:109111).

Zmud also presented the idea that information manipulation can occur beyond
human-to-human interaction; it can exist in human-to-machine (artifact) interaction just
as easily. This research will look at how a person, group, or company can be
manipulated using artifact (email) based manipulation. As this technology grows, so
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does the reliance we place on these systems to provide accurate information. This
reliance is a trust relationship and must be nurtured over time. Since trust exists in this
human-to-artifact model, new forms of electronic mediated deception are likely to take
place.
Throughout history people have created machines to simplify their work. These
machines not only simplified their tasks, but they also reduced the opportunity for human
error in relatively mundane tasks. These automated machines increase proficiency,
reliability, and speed of the tasks being completed. In short, they are supposed to make
man’s life simpler and easier. Is this always a good thing though? Parasuraman
(1987:705) says that the goal of automation should not be to necessarily reduce workload
but to optimize it. Parasuraman points out, “To much automation may lead to
complacency, boredom, and poor monitoring behavior” (1984:705). In short, these
claims suggest that too much trust in automation can lead to poor performance or too
much reliance on the automation. An individual in this state will lack the vigilance to
detect this poor performance. His/her level of awareness to deception will decrease.
Parasuraman (1994:702) claims the best scenario is a combination of human-computer
monitoring. This is in direct line with the focus of this research. The best tool to detect
deception is through the use of the latest automated tools, computer systems, and human
training. These tools combined together will give an individual the greatest opportunity
to detect deception
With the use of machines to do our work, certain levels of trust are built. Muir
(1984:1912-1914) claims that trust is a dynamic expectation, which follows a certain
developmental progression as the relationship grows. It has a set hierarchical
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development order based on predictability, dependability, and faith. Predictability is the
consistency and desirability of its recurrent behavior over a certain period of time.
Dependability is described as a process of pushing a system beyond its usual limits into
unknown scenarios to see how dependable it is. Faith is the belief that a system can do
what it is designed to do without knowing specifically how it does something (Muir
1994). For instance, a pilot need not know how the autopilot works down to every
mundane task it performs; he just needs to know that it will fly the aircraft when engaged.
Computer systems are part of everyday life for most of the modernized world. People
who use them rely on them. It is reasonable to speculate that as dependence upon
computers continues to grow, we can no longer imagine life without them. The trust we
place in our technology leads to faith that it will function reliably, and faith leads to what
some would term an unhealthy reliance or dependence on something or someone.
Deception exploits this reliance. In order for people to continue trusting these systems,
security measures must be raised. Detection of deception and intrusion of these systems
must be a high priority in order for this trust to remain intact. Numerous researchers have
studied observed behavior as a measure of trust in aircrew’s reliance on automation
(Mosier, Skitka, & Heers, 2000; Mosier, Skitka, & Burdick 2000). In their studies,
participants were subjected to experiments using the aid of an auto pilot system to control
an aircraft. The purpose of this research was to show that, “Air crews have a tendency to
over-rely on automation to perform tasks and make decisions for them rather than using
the aids as one component of thorough monitoring and decision-making processes”
(Mosier, Skitka, & Heers, 2000: n. pag.). This trust dependence becomes a characteristic
an enemy can exploit. A study accomplished on Air Force Officers in the grades of 2nd
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Lieutenant through Captain at the Air Force Institute of Technology using the Air Battle
Space Management System showed similar results (Daly, 2002). Officers trusted the
automation to pick out targets and decide when to fire upon them. This over-reliance or
trust in the system caused numerous friendly aircraft to be targeted and shot down. The
only drawback of this study was the officers tested were not Air Battle Space managers
and had no prior training in Air Battle Space management. This demonstrates when a
person is put an unfamiliar situation he/she may tend to place a high level of trust in the
system. Another study performed by Zuboff (1988) on experienced airline pilots
examined two types of critical flight errors, automation omission and commision errors.
Automation omission errors occurred when the pilot failed to take appropriate action
when the autopilot system did not provide the information needed. Automation
commission errors were caused when the pilot miscalculated the aircraft’s position based
on incorrect information presented by the autopilot system. The study by Zuboff (1988)
showed that automation bias can exist in experience-trained personnel who are
considered experts in their field.

Information Warfare
Information has long been considered a crucial resource to winning victories on
and off the battlefield. The great military strategist Sun Tzu (6th Century B.C.) said,
“Attaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the pinnacle of excellence.
Subjugating the enemy's army without fighting is the true pinnacle of excellence.” With
the advancement in computer information systems and the Internet, vast amounts of
information are readily available from just about anywhere in the world. The goal of
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information warfare is to deny our enemy critical information and communication needed
for victory and to capitalize on this same information and communication to be
successful in our missions. Information warfare has many different variations of
definitions. For the purpose of this research (IW) is defined as the following:
The offensive and defensive use of information and information systems
to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy an adversary's information,
information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based
networks while protecting one's own. Such actions are designed to
achieve advantages over military or business adversaries. (Goldburg,
1996)
In the past, information gathering within a military context required the placement
of personnel within an enemy’s borders. This was costly from both human and monetary
perspectives. Individuals often gave their lives to relay critical information about their
enemies. Although this type of information gathering is still critical today, it is used less
frequently. Instead, technologies such as satellite imaging, advances in transportation,
and advanced communication capabilities have allowed countries to close the geographic
gap that existed even ten years ago. Also, advancements in communications and the
connectivity via the Internet have increased countries’ dependencies upon one another.
Consider, for example, a modern country’s economic dependence on another in the form
of trade and commerce—essentially, the two countries’ economies are linked by
import/export agreements, tariff structures, multinational enterprises, etc. If country A
suffers economically, country B likely suffers as well (e.g., a “domino effect”).
Economic dependence on other countries is becoming more common as the world
conceptually “shrinks” due to ever-advancing technology. And, because of the
intricacies of a globally-networked economy, the protection once afforded to economic,
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social, and military infrastructures by geographic distance is becoming progressively
more vulnerable because of the complexity of the Internet and our reliance upon
information systems controlling our infrastructures (Van Cleave, 1997:22). An adversary
can now easily, swiftly, and stealthily attack critical information systems using a wide
variety of methods. Military commanders must understand the capabilities of their
systems as well as the vulnerabilities. The key to any military victory is to never
underestimate your opponent. Our military must never rely on its technology
advancements to the degree that we believe superior technology is impervious from
deception or attack, for to do so could be the first step to downfall. Thus, research in
information systems and their vulnerabilities is critical to sustaining the sharpness of the
military’s sword. If we can find vulnerabilities in our information systems before our
enemies do, then we can develop ways to mitigate or eliminate them—which exactly
describes the mission of the Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC). AFIWC is
charged with developing, maintaining, and deploying Information Warfare/Command
and Control Warfare (IW/C2W) capabilities in support of operations, campaign planning,
acquisition, and testing. They act as a time-sensitive, single focal point for intelligence
data and C2W services, providing technical expertise for computer and communications
security. Further, AFIWC is the Air Force’s focal point for tactical deception and
operations security training, and they continuously monitor the service’s information
systems to assure and ensure a high posture of IS security.
The adaptable, unstructured, ever-present nature of the Internet, combined with its
near indispensability as a force enhancer, has fostered an arsenal of IW weapons and
strategies. One of those strategies, hacking, occurs when an unauthorized person or
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persons attempt to gain access to information systems, whether legally or illegally, statesponsored or rogue. Hackers attempt IS access for numerous reasons: information theft,
information manipulation, or plain curiosity. Hackers desire information, a commodity
that can be viewed as a form of power. In fact, that power is probably the single most
influential reason why hackers hack (Denning, 1999:188). Another strategy is direct
launch, the use of viruses and logic bombs. This strategy can wreak havoc on users
because a direct launch can be deployed in a number of different forms. Presently, the
most prevalent are email-based viruses since the virus can be sent to anyone merely by
typing in an intended target’s email address (Robb, 2002:2). In most cases, this virus (of
which the recipient is probably completely unaware) requires a recipient to initiate the
virus by opening an attachment of some type. Once opened, the virus may self-propagate
with no action required of the (current) recipient and email itself out to everyone in the
recipient’s email address book and then drop its payload on the initial recipient’s system
(e.g., delete files, etc.). Another IW strategy is forward basing (Denning, 1999:188).
This type of virus lies dormant in the system for a period of time until a specific action
launches it; for example, it might be a single node in a massive pre-planned denial of
service (DoS) attack. Once propagated, and at a predetermined moment in time, the virus
can self-launch from each of its many victim computer systems (called “zombies”) and
send a flood of email to a targeted server or servers for any set length of time. The
targeted computer is often unable to deal with the DoS attack; even if the targeted server
can screen out the zombie emails, it may become so unbearably slow as to be functionally
unavailable to legitimate users. More likely, the server will simply crash. Once this virus
cycle is started, it can be difficult to detect and harder to stop or eradicate. Another
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method an attacker can misuse IS, one that is simplistic and requires little knowledge of
networks or how computer systems operate, is electronic identity theft, discussed in the
next section. Related to electronic identity theft is assumption of false identity. For
example, recently, a teenager in a major United States metropolitan area, somehow in
possession of a police radio, was able to falsely assume the identity of a police
dispatcher. This miscreant sent out false commands and alarms, effectively tying up the
city’s 911 emergency assets for a period of hours until he was finally apprehended
(Gunsch, 2002). Because the teenager had the radio, unrestricted access (i.e., no code
access or encryption of the radio signal), and motive to misuse a system in which high
trust existed, he was able to easily violate the trust model that 911 responders had in their
dispatch system. Similarly, false commands or orders could be issued to military
personnel via email, and once discovered to be false, could result in a violation of the
trust relationship.
One way to protect information systems from these types of exploitations is a
Defense in Depth strategy (DiD). DiD combine the capabilities of people, operations,
and security technologies to establish layers of protection, and is analogous to a home
protection strategy (e.g., fenced property, motion-activated lighting, door locks, burglar
alarm, firearm, etc.) (Paul, 2001). DiD for IS security may include protective layers such
as physical protection, user vigilance, access controls, user-level privileges, firewalls,
intrusion detection system, virus protection software, and other computer-based forms of
protection (e.g., screen locks, timeouts, audits, etc.). The purpose of a DiD strategy is to
implement a multi-layered defense so that critical information systems are protected and
will continue to operate should one or more of the safeguards be thwarted. The Common
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Access Card (CAC) employed by the U.S. Air Force is one form of that Defense in Depth
strategy. One of the security features of the CAC card is it allows users to authenticate
their email when sending it to other email users. The email receiver can then verify this
authentication to know for certain that the email originated from a trusted source. This
security feature not only provides for human authentication by the email recipient, but
also provides system authentication by the email servers. The computer system can
authenticate the email message when it is received therefore removing the possibility that
the user might not verify the sender is a trusted source. The best security measure though
is when both the system and the user verify the authentication. Parasuraman (1987)
points this out in his claim that the most potent protection component, is when both
human and system vigilance is combined to ensure information integrity.

Identity Theft
Identity theft occurs without the victim’s knowledge, when an individual steals or
assumes a victim’s identity for the purpose of committing a crime (Arnold, 2000).
Denning (1999:193) adds,
Identity theft is the misuse of another person’s identity, such as a
name, social security number, driver’s license, credit card numbers, and
bank account numbers. The objective is to take actions permitted to the
owner of the identity, such as withdraw funds, transfer money, charge
purchases, get access to information, or issue documents and letters under
the victim’s identity.
Through the use of information systems and the World Wide Web, identity theft
is a crime that is growing exponentially. In 2001 alone, more than eighty-five thousand
people reported some form of identity theft (Robb, 2002:2). Information systems make it
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easier for one to steal another’s identity because customers no longer need to be
physically present to purchase something. Purchases can be made over the Internet just
by knowing a person’s name and credit card number.
A criminal can use many methods to steal an individual’s identity. They range
from high-tech Internet snooping to low-tech dumpster diving. The Federal Trade
Commission lists on their Internet site numerous ways the crime is committed (FTC-1,
2002). Mail theft is a common method of identity theft, and can be committed in several
different ways. The thief can go to the post office, fill out a change of address form, and
have the victim’s mail forwarded to his or her address. Another form of mail theft is to
steal the victim’s mail from his/her mailbox. Mail theft would be an easy way to steal a
new credit card application. For instance, suppose an individual receives a pre-approved
credit application. The thief steals the application, fills it out, and mails it to the credit
card company, except with the thief’s mailing address. The thief has just successfully
stolen the victim’s credit card, and the victim has no idea the theft has taken place.
Vigilance would certainly pay off in this instance; if the victim periodically monitored his
or her credit, chances are that a newly issued credit card would be noticed. It is
conceivable that, if noticed early enough, the victim could alert authorities before an
unauthorized purchase even takes place, and could even lead to apprehension of the thief.
Other forms of identity theft include stealing information by looking over someone’s
shoulder (“shoulder surfing”), illegally obtaining credit records, and stealing personal
data records. The Internet is a potential identity thief’s delight: it provides a nameless,
faceless, anonymous interface, and makes identity theft easier and more difficult to
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defend against. An identity thief can devastate a victim’s life with just a few keystrokes
of a keyboard.
However, this research notes a second form of identity theft: electronic identity
theft, which is committed via some type of electronic communication such as computers,
cell phones, or PDAs. Some examples include hackers stealing passwords or other
personal information, software Trojans, web page spoofing, email relay eavesdropping,
spam-mail forgeries, and email forgery (Denning, 1999:195). Software Trojans are
programs that are downloaded to a user’s computer with the intent of stealing personal
information such as names, passwords, credit card numbers, birth dates, email addresses,
and other forms of personal information. For example, the Chaos Computer Club
demonstrated how a web-delivered Trojan could siphon money out of a person’s bank
account. Their program used ActiveX, an application that downloads a document or
application and runs it on the user’s computer. This ActiveX application scanned the
user’s computer for Quicken, a financial application with a built-in funds transfer
capability; if it was found, the Trojan extracted details about the user’s bank accounts and
created a phony transaction to move money from the user’s account(s) to a Chaos account
(Denning, 1999:197). Web page spoofing, traditionally viewed as hackers exploiting IS
vulnerabilities to insert their own illegitimate web pages, can also occur from the web
server direction. For example, Princeton researchers demonstrated that, after enticing
someone to their web site, they were able to keep the person within their site when the
user tried to go elsewhere by presenting counterfeit non-Princeton web pages to them, all
done without the user ever knowing the spoof had taken place (Denning, 1999:199).
Email relays provide a service to users that allow them to have a permanent email
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address while another email provider hosts the actual email service. One such email
relay company is bigfoot.com. A user can obtain a permanent email address from
bigfoot.com (e.g., yourname@bigfoot.com), while another company (e.g., AOL) serves
as the person’s actual email host interface; bigfoot.com simply forwards all email
received for that user to their current email host server. If a user changes their email
service, they provided bigfoot.com with the new host server information, and
bigfoot.com can then forward their email (still directed to yourname@bigfoot.com) to
their new email host without the user having to change their actual email address. The
drawback with this type of service is that the email relay service can eavesdrop on all
email going through their servers. Nevertheless, this type of service might appear
attractive to anyone who frequently changes email services, such as PCSing military
members. Milmail, one such provider based in the Netherlands, targets email relay
specifically to military members; however, a significant concern is that Milmail could
theoretically collect information on military personnel, movements, and operations, and
sell it to our enemies. Spam-mail forgeries occur when bulk email is sent out with a
bogus return email address. For example, a denial of service (DoS) attack utilizing a
spam-mail forgery took down 1-800-flowers’ servers. A spammer sent out a bogus email
using flowers.com as the return email address advertising a non-existent flower sale.
Flowers.com, flooded with more emails than they could handle, was forced to shut down
their email servers. The final type of electronic identity theft is email forgery. Email
forgery is defined as someone changing the outgoing email address to appear to originate
from someone or some organization other than it actually did; essentially, the email
forger assumes someone else’s position or identity through the use of email. For
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example, at Dartmouth College, a student sent an email message from a department
secretary that claimed an examination was canceled (Denning, 1999:202). Email
forgeries are relatively easy and do not require a vast amount of technical knowledge to
commit; forgers can steal an individual’s or organization’s email identity through several
methods. One method that does require a substantial amount of technical ability is
hacking into the victim’s computer account/email account. This method would probably
exceed most users’ abilities. However, much easier is simply changing the return address
to something other then the actual email origination; curiously, some email services allow
the sender to change the outgoing email address to anything they want. Another form of
email forgery is to create a bogus hotmail, yahoo or some other commercial source email
account with the individual’s name as the address. All of these are forms of electronic
identity theft.
The federal government is trying to prevent this type of criminal activity. For
example, in 1998 Congress passed the Federal Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence
Act, which established identity theft as a felony and defined it as the following:
“Any individual who knowingly transfers or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person with the intent to
commit, or to aid or abet, any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation
of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under any applicable state or
local law” (FTC-2, 2002).
Additionally, the act calls for violators to be investigated by the U.S. Secret
Service, the FBI, the U.S. Postal Service and calls for the Department of Justice to
prosecute any form of this criminal activity. The final provision in this act allows victims
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to receive financial restitution from the individual who committed the crime against
them.
This research will conduct a study on Air Force personnel to determine if email
forgery is a vulnerability to which they are susceptible. The study will involve creating a
forged email address from some commercial source to duplicate a military email address.
It will involve sending emails to participants to see if they can determine which of the
emails came from a forged source. If it is determined that the majority of participants
respond to the email forgery, then a new vulnerability the Air Force needs to be aware of
will have been identified.

Research Hypotheses and Model
Studies done on whether humans are good detectors of deception have shown that
humans are not good at detecting deception and in most cases are no better than chance.
Studies show that lie detection accuracy falls in the range of 45%-60% (Zuckerman et al.,
1984; DePaula et al., 1985). Many research in the arena of deception detection focuses
on interpersonal forms of deception, which is face-to-face communication. IDT as stated
previously involves verbal and non-verbal communication with both strategic and nonstrategic behaviors. Non-verbal and verbal cues are given by the sender and processed
and interpreted by the receiver. In text-based communication, there are no non-verbal
cues only verbal cues. These verbal cues are text-based, so no noise takes place. The
receiver only sees words written on a document or software system. This narrows the
number of cues a receiver has to detect, but it also lowers the number of ways a person
can deceive. Studies in interpersonal communication reveal that there are two results that
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can increase a persons’ sensitivity to deception, they are: 1) training on deception
detection (DePaulo et al., 1983; Zuckerman et al., 1984; deTurck et al., 1990) and 2)
receiving explicit alerts about the possibility of deception within a text-based medium
(Biros et al., 2002; Miller and Stiff, 1993; Parasuraman, 1984; Stiff et al., 1992).
DeTurck et al. (1990) found that formal training for observers to detect deception
improved their judgmental precision. Biros et al. (2002) found that training in a text
based or artifact-based environment does not necessarily increase an individual’s ability
to detect deception. This study also found that user experience and awareness or
suspicion significantly improved a person’s ability to detect deception in text-based
medium. The model for this research began with the construct defined in the research by
Biros et al. (2002) that warnings will increase an individual’s ability to detect deception.
In their research, they were looking at whether traditional training would increase an
individual’s ability to detect deception in computer based data. Although they found that
traditional training did not increase an individual’s ability to detect deception, they did
find that by issuing a warning prior to the deception the participants’ ability to detect
deception was increased. Therefore, we would expect this construct to apply to the
research in electronic identity theft – email forgery.
H1: Warnings about possible deception via electronic identity theft will be
positively associated with detection success.
Since warnings decrease an individual’s level of trust, it should also be positively
associated with a heightened level of awareness. Existing research points out that
individuals are generally not good at detecting deception, but if an individual’s awareness
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is aroused, their ability to detect deception increases (Stiff et al., 1992; Miller and Stiff,
1993; Parasuraman, 1984; Biros et al., 2002). Therefore, we expect:
H2: Warnings about possible electronic identity theft will be positively
associated with an individual’s level of awareness.
Buller and Burgoon (1996:209) say, “trust is the foundation on which enduring
relationships are built, and trust grows with the belief that another is communicating in a
honest, straightforward manner.” If a warning suggests someone is not communicating in
a straight forward manner, this warning arouses suspicion and causes a receiver not to
necessarily believe what the sender is communicating. Stiff et al. (1992) suggests that in
relationships with well-developed truth biases, warnings from a third party will decrease
the receiver’s levels of trust in the relationship. Information from a third party may be
sufficient to provoke suspicion and affect truth bias judgments. Stiff et al. (1992) further
suggests that the truth bias heuristic serves to increase judgments of truthfulness,
therefore aroused suspicion by a third party to the receiver will offset this bias, producing
greater judgments of deceptiveness. For instance, when an individual places a high level
of trust in a system and that trust has been established over time, the individual will be
less susceptible to detecting deception unless some form of warning provokes suspicion,
therefore decreasing levels of trust. Warnings will place an individual in a heightened
state of alert (Stiff et al., 1992; Biros et al., 2002). Therefore, we expect:
H3: Warnings about possible electronic identity theft will be negatively
associated with system trust.
Lee (1992) found that when trust is low, self-confidence is high. He found that as
trust declines, self-confidence rises (Lee, 1992; Lee and Moray, 1992). We would expect
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as this heightened state of alert or awareness increases, levels of system trust would
decrease. It is thought that if a participant’s level of system trust is high, (i.e., they have a
high level of trust that the system will identify the deceptive messages,) then he or she
will be less likely to identify deceptive messages themselves. In regards to awareness, it
is thought that if the participant’s awareness is high, then the participant will be more
likely to identify deceptive messages because he or she will be more alert. It is
hypothesized that system trust and awareness are inversely correlated. That is, if system
trust is high, awareness will be low. Also, if awareness is high, system trust will be low.
Therefore, we expect:
H4a: System trust will be negatively associated with awareness.

Muir (1992) suggests that trust in machines will increase with experience over
time. The longer an individual works with a reliable system, the greater the level of trust.
Lee (1992) found that as self-confidence declines, levels of trust are increased. Stiff et al.
(1992) says that well-established trust relationships (truth bias) are not likely to become
suspicious on their own. Increased levels of trust are established unless a third party
introduces some form of suspicion. Egan et al. (1961) showed that an observer’s
sensitivity in detecting a signal declines over time. This decline in sensitivity is in direct
relationship with the decision heuristic that it is easier to trust than it is to perceive deceit
in communication (Buller et al., 1991a; Buller et al., 1991b; Stiff et al., 1992; McCornack
and Parks, 1986). This increase in levels of trust has a direct effect on an individual’s
ability to detect deception in communication – sensitivity to deception is likely to decline
over time (Parasuraman, 1984). Because a user’s level of trust (or faith) has been
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established and grown through successful past uses, it is easier for the user to trust that
continued successful communications will occur in the present than it is to attempt to
detect deception. Therefore, we expect:
H4b: System trust will be negatively associated with deception detection.
Warnings will cause an individual to place a lower level of trust in a system (Stiff
et al., 1992). Awareness is that heightened state of alert caused by the third party
suspicion introduction (warning). This warning induced awareness was shown to
increase an individual’s ability to detect deception correctly in the Biros et al. (2002)
study. Hence, since suspicion is now introduced (or perhaps awareness heightened to an
unacceptable level from a previous minimally acceptable level), there is cause for the
truth bias norm to be questioned. Therefore we expect:
H5: Awareness about possible electronic identity theft will be positively
associated with deception detection.
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Figure 2: Theoretical Research Model for Research in Electronic Identity Theft
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Summary
This chapter provided a literature review of the body of knowledge on deception,
trust, information warfare, identity theft, and email forgery. In addition, it presented a
theoretical framework from which the research problem could be explored. Finally, a set
of hypotheses were presented to predict the type of relationships between each of the
defined constructs. The research model can be seen in Figure 2 on the previous page.
Chapter III describes a research method to investigate the theorized relationship between
warnings, system trust, awareness, and detection of information manipulation. Chapter
IV presents the analysis of the data collected, statistical methods used, and inferences
made about the data. Chapter V presents the research findings, conclusions and
recommendations for future research efforts.

40

III. Methodology

Study Summary
In order to study a person’s trust, awareness, and ability to detect manipulation in
an information system, a two stage process was developed consisting of a questionnaire,
and an information system manipulation experiment. This allowed analysis of the
constructs defined in Chapter II of this research. The questionnaire was used to study the
relationships between warnings and participants’ levels of system trust and awareness.
An experiment phase was used to provide a manipulation of an information system to
determine how participants who receive a warning perform against those who do not
receive a warning. The information system used was the Air Force Institute of
Technology (AFIT) email system. Two experiments were conducted to allow this
research to compare and confirm the findings from each of the experiments.

Participants
The participants in Experiment 1 were 80 officers at AFIT’s Graduate School of
Engineering and Management, between the ranks of 2Lt and Maj (grades O1 – O4).
Each participant had a Bachelor’s degree and was a student working towards a Master of
Science or Doctorate of Science Degree at AFIT. Seventy-six of the participants in the
Experiment 1 were officers in the U.S. Air Force. There was one participant each from
the U.S. Marine Corps, the Turkish Air Force, the Australian Air Force, and the South
Korean Air Force. The participants’ mean age was 29.7 years old. The participants
included 68 males and 12 females. The level of email experience ranged from three years
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to more than 10 years experience. Seven participants had some level of experience with
computer security. The participants in Experiment 2 were 67 Air Force officers, two Air
Force enlisted, two Marine enlisted, and one Air Force civil service personnel at AFIT’s
Graduate School of Engineering and Management. Experiment 2’s military participants’
ranks ranged from SSgt to Capt (grades E6 – O3). Each participant had a Bachelor’s
degree and was a student working towards a Master of Science or Doctorate of Science
Degree at AFIT. The participants’ mean age was 30.3 years old. The participants
included 61 males and 11 females. The level of email experience ranged from two years
to more than 10 years experience. Fifteen participants had some level of experience with
computer security. In this research each participant participated in both the questionnaire
and experiment.

Procedures
Due to the nature of the manipulation during both experiment phases of this study,
the Air Force Research Laboratory Human Subjects Committee required all participants
to read and sign a consent form. This was accomplished by meeting with the
participants. Each participant was given time to read, review, and ask any questions
concerning his or her participation in this research project. Participants were told to
review the consent form, sign it, and return it no later than one week from the day they
received it. The consent form and Human Subjects Review Board application can be
seen in Appendix A.
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Questionnaire
The questionnaire consisted of 15 questions and was administered electronically.
Ten questions were tailored to identify system trust. Five questions were tailored to
identify awareness. On all items, participants indicated their level of agreement with
each item using a five point Likert scale: 5 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = No Opinion,
2 = Disagree, and 1 = Strongly Disagree. The questionnaire used to identify trust and
awareness was developed and empirically tested by researchers at the Center for Multisource Information Fusion (CMIF) (Jian, Bisantz, & Drury, 1998). The original set of
items was tailored to specifically measure system trust and awareness relative to the
AFIT email system. Jian et al. (2000) anticipated this type of manipulation and designed
the questions to be generic and adaptable to specific information systems. An example
from the CMIF questionnaire item measuring trust is, “I can trust the system.” For this
study, this item was tailored to read, “I can trust the AFIT Network Operations and
Security Center to protect me from attacks to the local area network and email.” For
awareness, an example from the CMIF questionnaire is, “I am wary of the system.” For
this study, this item was tailored to read, “I feel I am always aware of information
warfare threats and computer system vulnerabilities. Schmit, Ryan, Stierwalt, and Powell
found that items measuring context-specific personalities had higher validities then items
measuring general personality (1995). Based on this finding, it is believed that the items
used in this research are more context specific; therefore, they will be more valid.
The objective of the questionnaire was to show how system trust and awareness
were related to warnings and participants’ deception detection ability. This analysis was
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compared with the experiment to determine the overall success of this study. This can be
seen in Chapter IV on Analysis.

Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted on the questionnaire to ensure the survey proved
reliable for this study. The questionnaire was sent to all AFIT, School of Systems and
Logistics, faculty, and staff. Twenty-eight personnel responded by completing the
questionnaire. The participants’ mean age was 43 years old. The participants included
19 males and nine females. The level of email experience ranged from two years to more
than 10 years experience. In the pilot study, none of the participants had any experience
with computer security. The participants in the pilot study provided a good comparison
to the actual sample used in the study because experience with government email systems
was roughly the same. The largest difference between participants in the pilot study and
the actual study was participants were students, not faculty and staff. All participants,
both in the pilot study and in the final experiment were daily users of the AFIT email
system. In order to ensure reliability of the questionnaire during the pilot study a
reliability analysis was performed and recorded. The Cronbach’s alpha reported for the
10 items dealing with systems trust was .86 and the Cronbach’s alpha recorded for the
five items dealing with awareness was .70. A reliability level above .70 indicates the
measure is sufficiently reliable for studies using Likert scale items (Nunnally, 1978).
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Experiment
The research design for the first experiment used five emails sent at five different
times, with four of those emails coming from a legitimate source and one coming from a
fraudulent source (i.e., an email forgery) (See Table 1). For the second experiment a
three email design was used, with two of those emails coming from a legitimate source
and one coming from a fraudulent source (See Table 2). For the purposes of this study,
an email forgery is defined as a case where the source of the email address has been
manipulated. It was determined during Experiment 1 that four legitimate emails may
have conditioned the participants to the legitimate source, thus reducing their awareness
and ability to discover the email forgery. The Experiment 2 was designed with that
finding in mind. The AFIT Network Operations and Security Center
(AFIT.NOSC@afit.edu) was the legitimate source used to send the four legitimate emails
during Experiment 1 and the two legitimate emails during Experiment 2. Permission was
granted to duplicate the AFIT NOSC email address with a commercial source email
address. The commercial source email address was used for the fraudulent source. The
commercial source used to send the email forgery was
afit_network_operations_and_security_center@ (commercialsource).net. (The source
has been withheld to protect the rights of the corporation.) This email account was
created temporarily to execute these experiments. Once the experiments concluded, the
account was terminated.
The consent form mentioned the possibility of email manipulation increasing the
participants’ awareness to email manipulation. Due to this increased awareness of the
participants, an environment had to be created that reduced the participants’ awareness to
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information manipulation. This increased awareness was a problem and the reason
behind the five email design during Experiment 1. This five email design was used to
create a trusted environment in which the participants’ suspicion to email manipulation
was decreased. It was determined after Experiment 1 that the five emails may have
conditioned the participants causing their awareness to be decreased; therefore
Experiment 2 reduced the number of emails to a total of three. The emails were sent
every other day during a two week time-period. For example, during Experiment 1, at
time 1, the legitimate email was sent to five groups and the fraudulent email was sent to
one group. During the Experiment 2, the legitimate email was sent to three groups and
the fraudulent email was sent to one group.
Table 1: Experiment 1 - Research Design
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Table 2: Experiment 2 - Research Design
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In addition, during both experiments participants were randomly assigned to one
of two groups. The groups were named Warning Group and Non-Warning Group. The
Warning group received a message prior to the start of the experiment warning the
participants of a possible email forgery. This message explained to the participants what
an email forgery was and that the AFIT NOSC had seen an increase in this type of
fraudulent activity (See Appendix B for the actual warning email). The Non-Warning
Group did not receive this email. Next during Experiment 1, those two groups were
broken down into three sub-groups each. This brought the total number of groups for
Experiment 1 to six. The Warning Group was broken down into: Warning Group 1,
Warning Group 2, and Warning Group 3. The Non-Warning Group was accomplished
the same way: Non-Warning Group 1, Non-Warning Group 2, and Non-Warning Group
3. The six sub-groups were created to allow this research to determine if email forgeries
were more susceptible to detection early in the process or late in the process. During
Experiment 2, these two groups were broken down into two sub-groups each, two
Warning groups and two Non-Warning groups. This brought the total number of groups
for Experiment 2 to four.
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To determine how each sub-group performed over time, a timeline was devised to
specify when each sub-group would receive the email forgery from the fraudulent source
and when each sub-group would receive the four emails from the legitimate source (See
Tables 3 and 4). Non-Warning Group 1 was chosen to receive the email forgery at Time
1 for both experiments. The reason a non-warning group was chosen over a warning
group was to allow a certain amount of time to pass between the warning the warning
groups received and the actual email forgery. Warning Group 1 was chosen to receive
the email forgery at Time 2 for both experiments. Each of the six sub-groups in
Experiment 1 and four sub-groups in Experiment 2 were alternated until each sub-group
had received an email forgery at one of the five different times during Experiment 1 and
three different times during Experiment 2 (See Tables 3 and 4).
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Table 3: Experiment 1 - Timeline for email forgery for each sub-group (Total time interval
was two weeks).
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Table 4: Experiment 1 - Questions asked at each of the different time frames.
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Each sub-group received one email forgery from the fraudulent source at one of
the five determined times described in Table 3 for Experiment 1 and three different times
described in Table 4 for Experiment 2. The other sub-groups, when not receiving an
email forgery, received an email from the legitimate source. The six sub-groups in
Experiment 1 and the four sub-groups in Experiment 2 all received the same five and
three questions, respectively. There were five questions asked at the five different time
intervals during Experiment 1 and three questions ask at three different time intervals
during Experiment 2 (see Tables 5 and 6). For Experiment 1, at each time interval, five
of the six sub-groups received an email from the legitimate source and one of the six subgroups received an email forgery from a fraudulent source. For Experiment 2, at each
time interval, two of the three sub-groups received an email from the legitimate source
and one of the three sub-groups received an email forgery from a fraudulent source.
Questions asked at each specific time were the same regardless of where the email
originated. Participants received the email in their official email box and were asked to
reply to the email with a “yes” or “no” answer. All responses were sent to the researchers
email address for data collection purposes. “Yes” response was used if they were
satisfied with the support and a “no” response if they were not satisfied with the support.
The questions can be seen in tables 5 and 6. The five emails for Experiment 1 and three
emails for Experiment 2 were set to expire using Microsoft Outlook’s “expire on certain
date feature.” This feature automatically removed the email from the participant’s inbox,
and placed it in the participant’s deleted items folder. This was done to prevent the
participants from going back after the experiment to verify which email was a forgery.
The intent of the experiment was for the participant to identify the email forgery when it
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occurred, not at the end of the experiment. All efforts were made to prevent the
participants from identifying the email forgery at the end of the experiment verses when
it actually occurred.
Table 5: Experiment 1 - Questions asked at each of the different time frames.
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The questions were designed to be benign in nature. The questions did not ask the
participants any personal information. This was done to determine whether people paid
attention to the email address they were responding to. It was thought that if the
questions had asked the participants personal information it may have heightened their
awareness. This heightened awareness due to the context of the message was not a
desired result for this research. This research wanted to establish if participants paid
attention to the email address they responded to. The questions were designed to be
simple in nature (not suspicion arousing) to determine if they would respond to the forged
email based on the environment created from the experiment. It was hypothesized that
the warning sent to the Warning Group would raise suspicion, therefore causing a
heightened sense of awareness in the Warning Group. During Experiment 1, the only
way the participant could determine whether the message was from the legitimate source
or the fraudulent source was by looking at the sender’s address line on the email message.
During Experiment 2, a manipulation was made in the senders signature block to see if
cues in the message would help add to the participants’ ability to better identify the email
forgery (See Appendix C for this manipulation). In both experiments, when the
participants selected the reply to button from the forged email, the forged email address
afit_network_operations_and_security_center@commercialsource.net was displayed
directly in front of them in the To: address line. Each participant had an equal
opportunity to identify it. AFIT students and therefore these participants know from
previous computer security training during their in-processing to AFIT to be aware of the
sender’s address when replying to an email requesting any information. This includes
yes and no responses to emails. For the purposes of this study, the names and ranks of
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the participants were known. In a real world scenario, a criminal might have been trying
to establish if someone was a military member and where they worked. It is public
knowledge that U.S. Air Force email addresses are designed using a generic first
name.last name @ AirForceBase.af.mil procedure. For example,
john.doe@wpafb.af.mil. Criminals can use this to their advantage and send emails to a
list of names in the attempt that someone might reply. If someone does happen to reply,
the criminals have just verified the individual’s name, email address, and rank. Criminals
or terrorists who want to infiltrate our networks will do so patiently collecting
information in small pieces until they have what they need. The point of these
experiments was to determine if people paid attention to the email address they were
responding to, not necessarily to raise their awareness by asking for personal information.
The experiments concluded with an email asking the participants if they identified
any counterfeit emails during the two-week time period for these two research
experiments and to explain what they identified. This email was used to increase the
response rate to 100% from the participants because not all participants responded to the
five email questions during the experiment. The participants were asked to identify this
email forgery from memory and not to go back through their email folders to determine if
they could figure out which email was from a fraudulent source. The participants were
asked to be honest in their responses, as being deceived by the email forgery was part of
this research. The participants who did not identify the email forgery were asked to
respond to this email with a “no” reply. If the response was “yes”, the participant did
identify the email forgery when it occurred, and they correctly described what the
counterfeit email was, the participant received a second email asking them to identify
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which question was an email forgery. In this email, it listed each of the five questions
and had the participants identify which email was from a counterfeit source. If the
response was “no”, the participant did not receive a second email.

Summary
This chapter described a research method to investigate the theorized relationship
between warnings, system trust, awareness, and detection of information manipulation. It
described an experimental methodology and how each construct was operationalized and
measured. Chapter IV presents the analysis of the data collected. In this chapter each
stage of the research will be examined individually and then cross compared with the
other stages. For example, the results from the questionnaire will be examined
individually and than cross-analyzed with the results from the experiment. Chapter V
presents the research findings, conclusions and recommendations for future research
efforts.
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IV. Analysis

Overview of Questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed to show how system trust and awareness were
related to warnings and participants’ deception detection ability. It established a starting
point from which further research could determine the participants’ ability to detect
deceptive messages. It was thought that if a participant’s level of system trust was high,
(i.e., they had a high level of trust that the system would identify the deceptive
messages,) then he or she would be less likely to identify deceptive messages themselves.
In regards to awareness, it was thought that if the participant’s awareness was high, then
the participant would be more likely to identify deceptive messages because he or she
would be more alert. Therefore, it was hypothesized that system trust and awareness are
inversely correlated. That is, if system trust is high, awareness will be low. Also, if
awareness is high, system trust will be low. The questionnaire consisted of 15 items and
was administered electronically. As noted in the preliminary analysis, ten items were
tailored to identify levels of system trust. Five items were tailored to identify levels of
awareness. Participants indicated their level of agreement with each item using a fivepoint Likert response format where 5 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = No Opinion, 2 =
Disagree, and 1 = Strongly Disagree.

Factor Analysis of Questionnaire
A factor analysis was performed on both experiments separately and combined to
establish the construct validity of the measure. However, before this analysis was
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conducted, the data were examined to assess its suitability for this analysis. For
Experiment 1, the Bartlett’s test of spericity revealed the data was suitable for factor
analysis with a χ2 = 504.6, p < .01. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was .74 this exceeds the stated level for suitability of .70 (Hair, 1995). For
Experiment 2, the Bartlett’s test of spericity revealed the data was also suitable for factor
analysis with a χ2 = 282.1, p < .01. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was .79. The combined Bartlett’s test of spericity revealed the data was
suitable for factor analysis with a χ2 = 680.1, p < .01. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure
of sampling adequacy was .76. These tests of assumption reveal the data is suitable for
exploratory factor analysis. The factor analysis was performed on system trust and
awareness separately. For the 10 items used to measure system trust one factor was
expected, but the factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater then 1.0.
Eigenvalues that are less then 1.0 usually account for less variance. Kachigan states “the
rule of thumb is to retain factors with eigenvalues greater then 1.0” (1991, pp. 246). Two
items showed a significant cross loading between the two factors in both the analysis of
experiments individually and combined. Experiment 1 analysis revealed the item
measuring a participant’s belief in the system showed a loading of 0.61 for Factor 1 and
0.41 for Factor 2. The item measuring a participant’s comfort level in the system showed
a loading of 0.69 for Factor 1 and 0.36 for Factor 2. Experiment 2 analysis revealed the
item measuring a participant’s belief in the system showed a loading of 0.43 for Factor 1
and 0.69 for Factor 2. The item measuring a participant’s comfort level in the system
showed a loading of 0.55 for Factor 1 and 0.31 for Factor 2. The combined analysis
revealed the item measuring a participant’s belief in the system showed a loading of 0.53
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for Factor 1 and 0.57 for Factor 2. The item measuring a participant’s comfort level in
the system showed a loading of 0.61 for Factor 1 and 0.38 for Factor 2. These items were
removed and the factor analysis was performed a second time resulting in eight items
loading on a single factor in each of the three separate factor analysis termed “system
trust” (see Table 7). The final Experiment 1 factor analysis for system trust revealed a
single eigenvalue of 4.1 and loadings on a single factor captured 50% of the total
variance. The final Experiment 2 factor analysis for system trust revealed a single
eigenvalue of 4.2 and loadings on a single factor captured 52% of the total variance. The
final combined factor analysis for system trust revealed a single eigenvalue of 4.2 and
loadings on a single factor captured 52% of the total variance. The new combined
Cronbach’s alpha was .85. Experiment 1 Cronbach’s alpha was .82. Experiment 2
Cronbach’s alpha was .86.
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Table 7: Combined Experiment Factor Loadings of System Trust
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For the five items used to measure awareness one factor was expected, but the
factor analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater then 1.0 in the individual
analysis of Experiment 1 and 2, and the combined analysis. For Experiment 1 and the
combined analysis it was revealed that one item showed a significant cross loading
between the two factors and the other item loaded on the second factor. For Experiment
2 the analysis revealed two items with significant cross loadings. For Experiment 1, the
item measuring if a participant feels they are always aware of threats and vulnerabilities
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loaded on Factor 2 completely. The item asking the participant to state in their own
opinion what level of awareness do they feel they have against threats showed a loading
of 0.53 for Factor 1 and 0.63 for Factor 2. For Experiment 2, the item measuring if a
participant feels they are always aware of threats and vulnerabilities showed a loading of
0.65 on Factor 1 and 0.35 on Factor 2. The item asking the participant to state in their
own opinion what level of awareness do they feel they have against threats showed a
loading of 0.30 for Factor 1 and 0.79 for Factor 2. For the combined analysis, the item
measuring if a participant feels they are always aware of threats and vulnerabilities
loaded on Factor 2 completely. The item asking the participant to state in their own
opinion what level of awareness do they feel they have against threats showed a loading
of 0.68 for Factor 1 and 0.44 for Factor 2. After those two items were removed, each of
the three separate factor analysis yielded three items loading on a single factor, awareness
(see Table 8). The final Experiment 1 factor analysis for awareness revealed a single
eigenvalue of 1.7 and loadings on a single factor captured 57% of the total variance. The
final Experiment 2 factor analysis revealed a single eigenvalue of 1.6 and loadings on a
single factor captured 52% of the total variance. The combined factor analysis showed a
single factor with an eigenvalue of 1.7, accounting for 55% of the total variance. The
combined Cronbach’s alpha was .56. Experiment 1 Cronbach’s alpha was .62.
Experiment 2 Cronbach’s alpha was .41. However, since the item asking if the user
thinks warnings increase awareness loads at 0.54 whereas the other two items load at 0.84
and 0.82 this item was deleted and the combined Cronbach’s alpha improves to .68.
Therefore, awareness was measured using a two-item scale.
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Table 8: Combined Factor Loadings of Awareness
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The next phase of analysis was to test for whether the curves for system trust and
awareness were normally distributed. This can be seen in the skewness and kurtosis
reported in Table 9. The skewness is -0.48 and the kurtosis is 0.52 for system trust. This
shows the curve for systems trust was slightly skewed to the left because of its negative
skewness and the kurtosis was leptokurtic (thin bulging) since it has a positive value.
The skewness is -.99 and the kurtosis is 1.34 for awareness. The skewness for awareness
was skewed to a higher degree to the left then system trust and the kurtosis was even
more leptokurtic since it has a fairly high positive value. The skewness and kurtosis
values for both system trust and awareness are within the accepted range for the
assumption of normality (SPSS, 1999).
The next phase of the analysis for the questionnaire was to check the reliability of
the questionnaire. The combined Cronbach’s alpha reported for the eight-item system
trust scale decreased slightly from .86 to .85 after the factor analysis, but this is still
considered a high estimate of reliability (Nunnelly, 1978). This reliability analysis
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showed that the eight items used to measure system trust are reliable. The combined
Cronbach’s alpha reported for the three-item scale measuring awareness also slightly
decreased from .59 to .56 after the factor analysis. This is below normally accepted
levels of reliability and may be a weakness for this study. However, the Cronbach’s
alpha for the two-item scale increases from .59 to .68. This is slightly below the
normally accepted level of .7, but would be considered significant in statistical research
(Nunnelly, 1978). Therefore, the reliability analysis for the two-items used to measure
awareness is reliable. The Pearson correlation reflects that system trust and awareness
have no correlation (see Table 9 for values). This finding does not support hypothesis 4a
(i.e., system trust will be negatively associated with awareness). However, Nunnelly
says, “One should be extremely cautious in applying the deduction that there is no
correlation in samples of less than several hundred” (1978; p.128). Further analysis of
hypothesis 4a can be seen in the following section.
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for System Trust and Awareness

Variable

M

SD

S

K

a

System Trust

3.99

0.56

-0.43

0.52

0 35

Awareness

4.25

0.56

-99

1.34

0.56

NotiAkl22. S -SlHwtuii, K-Kuttoiu
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Analysis of Variance for Warning and Non-Warning Groups
The participants from Experiment 2 were divided into two randomly selected
groups of 36 participants each called Warning Group and Non-Warning Group. The
Warning Group received an email prior to the start of the questionnaire warning the
participants of a possible email forgery. This email explained to the participants what an
email forgery was and that the AFIT NOSC had seen an increase in this type of
fraudulent activity (see Appendix B for warning email). In Experiment 1, the warning
email was sent to the Warning Group after the questionnaire was administered and not
before. Therefore, one-way ANOVAs were not conducted. The results between groups
in Experiment 1 would have shown no difference, because neither the Warning Group
nor the Non-Warning Group had received anything that would have heightened their
awareness or lowered their system trust. During Experiment 2, the warning was sent to
the Warning Group before the questionnaire was administered. Therefore, a difference in
the system trust and awareness of the Warning and Non-Warning groups should have
been observed.
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine if there was a significant
difference in the Warning and Non-Warning groups of Experiment 2. The Warning
Group was coded with a 1 and the Non-Warning Group was coded with a 0. This is the
independent variable of this study. The result of the ANOVA comparing the means for
system trust revealed an F-statistic 0.082, which showed that the difference was
insignificant (p>.05) (SPSS, 1999). The result for awareness was 0.007, which also
showed that the differences were insignificant (p>.05) (SPSS, 1999). Therefore, the
results showed that system trust and awareness did not have a negative relationship. The
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results reveal that no relationship exists between system trust and awareness. This could
mean several things, it could mean system trust and awareness have no relationship as
reported by this study or it could mean the items used to measure system trust and
awareness do not fully depict those constructs. This finding does not support hypothesis
2 (i.e., warnings about possible electronic identity theft will be positively associated with
an individual’s awareness), hypothesis 3 (i.e., warnings about possible electronic identity
theft will be negatively associated with system trust), or hypothesis 4a (i.e., system trust
will be negatively associated with awareness). Table 10 presents the results for the
ANOVA.
Table 10: Experiment 2 ANOVA Results for Warning and Non-Warning Groups

Further analysis of the questionnaire revealed that system trust in well established
systems does not decrease when a warning suggesting manipulation of the system is
issued. This provides additional support to the finding from the ANOVA that revealed
hypothesis 3 was not supported. System trust in email systems remains almost the same
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(i.e., a person’s trust in the system does not decrease). This can be seen in the
comparisons of the distributions between the Warning Group and the Non-Warning
Group (see Figure 3). The mean system trust for Warning Group was 4.03 and for the
Non-Warning Group was 4.06. Standard deviation for the Warning Group was 0.5 and
for the Non-Warning Group was .61. The plot reveals that each distribution is extremely
similar, leading this research to conclude, that system trust does not decrease if a warning
suggesting manipulation is issued.

Figure 3: Distribution Plot for System Trust of Warning and Non-Warning Groups

Further analysis of the questionnaire also revealed that warnings do not appear to
increase a participant’s awareness level. This provides additional support to the finding
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from the ANOVA that revealed hypothesis 2 was not supported. Awareness is not
heightened from a previous level (i.e., a person’s awareness is not increased). This can
be seen in the comparisons of the distributions between the Warning Group and the NonWarning Group (see Figure 4). The mean awareness for Warning Group was 4.35 and
for the Non-Warning Group was 4.36. Standard deviation for the Warning Group was
0.43 and for the Non-Warning Group was .48. The plot reveals that each distribution is
extremely similar, leading this research to conclude, that awareness does not increase if a
warning suggesting manipulation is issued.

Figure 4: Distribution Plot for Awareness of Warning and Non-Warning Groups
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Experiment Analysis
Two separate experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 consisted of 80
participants while Experiment 2 consisted of 72 participants. The experiments were
designed to show whether warnings had any affect on a participant’s ability to detect
email forgery. Thirty-three out of 80 participants responded to the email forgery in
Experiment 1 for a 41% response rate. Thirty-two out of 72 participants responded to the
email forgery in Experiment 2 for a 44% response rate. Both experiments concluded
with an email asking the participants if they identified any counterfeit emails during the
two-week experimental time period. Based on the participants’ responses to this email in
Experiment 1, 63 participants reported not identifying the email forgery when it occurred,
7 participants reported correctly identifying the email forgery when it occurred, and 10
participants did not respond to any of the emails. The responses from this final email for
Experiment 2 were 53 participants reported not identifying the email forgery when it
occurred, 8 participants reported correctly identifying the email forgery when it occurred,
and 11 participants did not respond to any of the emails. Therefore, the 10 participants in
Experiment 1 and the 11 participants in Experiment 2 were not used in the final analysis
of this experiment. The analysis of the experiments can be seen in Table 11 for
Experiment 1 and Table 12 for Experiment 2. The two experiments revealed that
warnings do not have a positive effect on a participant’s ability to detect deception. This
finding does not support hypothesis 1 (i.e., warnings about possible deception in
electronic identity theft will be positively associated with detection success).
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Table 11: Experiment 1 Results

Table 12: Experiment 2 Results

67

In order to determine if participants in the warning groups were able to identify
the email forgery earlier or later during the experiments the warning groups were split
into three groups for Experiment 1 and two groups for Experiment 2. It was thought that
the warning groups who received the email forgery earlier would be able to identify the
email forgery more accurately then those groups who received the email forgery at later
times. This did not occur. The warning groups who received the email forgery at time 2
and were deceived were comparable to those warning groups who received the email
forgery at later times. The results revealed that the interval between the warning email
and the email forgery had no effect. The results can be seen in Tables 13 and 14.
Table 13: Experiment 1 Responses to Forged Email Address

Table 14: Experiment 1 Responses to Forged Email Address
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Analysis of Variance for Deceived and Not Deceived Participants
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to determine if there was a significant
difference in the system trust and awareness of those participants who were deceived and
those who were not deceived. The deceived participants were coded with a 0 and the
participants not deceived were coded with a 1. This is the independent variable of this
study. The result of the ANOVA comparing the means for the system trust revealed an
F-statistic 0.569, which showed that the difference was insignificant (p>.05) (SPSS,
1999). The F-statistic result for awareness was 5.4, which showed a significant
difference (p<.05) (SPSS, 1999). Therefore, the results for system trust do not support
hypothesis 4b (i.e., System trust will be negatively associated with deception detection).
However, the results for awareness do support hypothesis 5 (i.e., Awareness about
possible electronic identity theft will be positively associated with deception detection).
Table 15 presents the results for the ANOVA.
Table 15: ANOVA for Deceived and Not Deceived Participants

Deceived

Not Deceived
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Summary
This chapter presented the analysis of the data collected. In this chapter the
questionnaire and the experiment were examined individually and then compared with
the each other. For example, the results from the questionnaire were examined
individually and than cross-analyzed with the results from the experiment. Chapter V
presents the research findings, conclusions, and recommendations for future research
efforts.
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V. Findings and Recommendations
Research Findings and Implications
The results of this research contain important implications for the U.S. Military
and other governmental agencies that depend on email for disseminating information.
The overarching question for this research was threefold: 1) to determine if email forgery
is a significant vulnerability in U.S. Air Force and DoD email systems, 2) to determine
what affect warnings have on human system trust, human awareness, and an individual’s
ability to detect deception, and 3) to research the relationship between human system
trust and human awareness in information systems. This research effort supports the
finding that U.S. Air Force personnel at the Air Force Institute of Technology appear to
be extremely vulnerable to email forgery manipulation. This finding is based on the
results of two experiments performed at two separate times with different personnel. The
two experiments revealed that 90% (137 out of 152) of the participants failed to identify
the email forgery when it occurred and 42% (65 out of 152) actually responded to the
email forgery. Therefore, this research supports the finding that email forgery is a
significant vulnerability U.S. Military organizations need to be aware of.
Biros et al. (2002) found in their deception detection research that the issuance of
a warning prior to the deception increased detection performance in those individuals.
This research attempted to confirm that finding. On the contrary, the finding of this
research was exactly the opposite. The findings from this research revealed that warnings
do not increase a participant’s ability to correctly identify email forgeries. Therefore, this
finding does not support hypothesis 1. This finding along with the finding of Biros et al.

71

(2002) does demonstrate that warnings affect people differently. The findings lead this
research to theorize about what types of warnings are sufficient enough to increase
suspicion to an acceptable level. Therefore, a recommendation for future research is to
examine at what level warnings increase suspicion in order to demonstrate behaviors in
trust and awareness or other behaviors which affect an individual’s ability to detect
deception.
Past research (Stiff et al., 1992; Miller and Stiff, 1993; Parasuraman, 1984; Biros
et al., 2002) found that if an individual’s suspicion is aroused, their ability to detect
deception increases. The findings from this research suggest that awareness did not
increase in those individuals who were issued a warning. Therefore the finding from this
research does not support hypothesis 2. This finding could mean that the instrument used
to measure awareness did not effectively measure this behavior, but the statistical
analysis of the instrument does not support this. The finding could mean that the warning
issued did not increase suspicion to an acceptable level to cause an increase in an
individual’s awareness. I feel the findings of this research, along with the findings of
previous research on warnings (Biros et al. 2002), support the second meaning (i.e., the
warning issued did not increase suspicion to an acceptable level to cause an increase in
awareness). Both of these results suggest future research to confirm the effectiveness of
the instrument used to measure awareness and to determine the effectiveness of warnings
used in computer system alerts.
Stiff et al. (1992) suggests that in relationships with well-developed truth biases,
warnings from a third party will decrease the receiver’s level of trust in the relationship.
Information from a third party may be sufficient to provoke suspicion and affect truth
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bias judgments. Therefore, it was thought that warnings would decrease an individual’s
level of trust in a specific system. This research supports the generalization that system
trust, in well established systems, does not decrease, when a warning suggesting possible
manipulation of the system is issued. This supports what Daly (2002) found. System
trust is developed and strengthened over time and it is difficult to reduce system trust
levels in relationships (human-computer) with well established truth biases. Therefore,
this finding does not support hypothesis 3. This could be a result of the warning issued.
It is possible the warning was too generic or not assertive enough to increase suspicion to
an acceptable level which would not have caused a decrease in the individual’s system
trust. Future research should experiment with the use of several variations of warnings to
determine how warnings affect individuals differently.
It was thought that if a participant’s level of system trust is high, (i.e., they have a
high level of trust in the system to identify the deceptive messages,) then he or she will be
less likely to identify deceptive messages themselves. In regards to awareness, it is
thought that if the participant’s awareness is high, then the participant will be more likely
to identify deceptive messages because he or she will be more alert. The finding from
this research did not support the idea that system trust and awareness are inversely
correlated. In addition, it was determined by this research that no relationship exists
between system trust and awareness. Therefore, hypothesis 4a was not supported. This
could have to do with the possibility that the warning was not specific enough to have
generated enough suspicion to induce an increase in awareness and a decrease in system
trust. The other possibility is that the questionnaire did not properly measure the desired
behaviors of system trust and awareness.
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The comparison analysis of the questionnaire and the experiment of those who
were deceived and not deceived revealed that hypothesis 4b was not supported. The
results revealed that the system trust in those individuals who received a warning and
those who did not was very similar. Therefore leading this research to conclude that
system trust was not negatively associated with deception detected. This again, as
mentioned previously, could have to do with the warning that was issued or the
effectiveness of the questionnaire in measuring the desired constructs.
The comparison analysis of the questionnaire and the experiment revealed that
hypothesis 5 was supported. The finding for hypothesis 5 revealed that the awareness of
those who identified the email forgery was higher than those who did not identify the
email forgery. The breakdown of the 15 individuals who identified the email forgery was
nine individuals from the Warning Group and six from the Non-Warning Group. The
analysis of the data revealed no reasons as to why their awareness was higher, only that it
was higher. There were no demographic correlations which revealed why these
individuals had a heightened sense of awareness. There were no correlations to the
warning that was issued based on the fact that six from the Non-Warning Group
discovered the email forgery. A correlation was found between eight of the 15
individuals. This correlation revealed that these eight individuals at some time in the past
had been a victim of some type of information system attack. Therefore, their awareness
was in a constant-heightened state because of a past experience. This finding does
support the use of the Air Forces computer security awareness training which could have
also been a reason why these individuals awareness was heightened. A complete
summary of the findings can be seen in Table 16.
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Table 16: Summary of Findings
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H4b

Syslemtrustwill be negatively associated with deception
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H5

Awareness aboutpossible electronic identitytheft will be
positively assoaated with deception detected
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Limitations
The participants for the two experiments were active duty U.S. military personnel
at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Future research efforts need to be expanded to
other random units across the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Military, and other DoD organizations
to determine if other email systems are vulnerable to the threat of email forgery. These
research efforts should include a higher ratio of officer/enlisted personnel to determine if
there is a significant difference between these groups’ ability to detect email forgeries.
The participants were required to sign a consent form which posed another
limitation for this research. The consent form mentioned the possibility of an email
manipulation. This statement in the consent form could have raised the awareness levels
of the participants beyond an acceptable level for this study. This could have been a
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reason for the heightened level of awareness in the participants who detected the email
forgery. A heightened level of awareness due to the consent form was not a desired
result for this study. The study may have been more beneficial and may have provided
better results had the participants’ not had to provide a consent form. This would have
allowed for use of the original research design of one email versus the five-email package
developed for Experiment 1 and the three-email package developed for Experiment 2.
The original protocol designed for this study was to send out one email forgery and no
legitimate emails to the entire AFIT student body and then evaluate whether a participant
was deceived by measuring the number of responses to the email forgery account. This
would have provided a more natural setting for this experiment therefore, possibly
providing better overall results. The Air Force Research Laboratories Human Subject
Review board denied this protocol because the Air Force does not allow manipulation
protocols without the participants’ consent. The one-email protocol may have provided a
more accurate measure of participants’ ability to detect this form of email manipulation.
The amount of time between the administration of the consent form and the email
manipulation was another limitation of this research. Future studies should lengthen this
time; the results may improve.
A limitation on the application of the questionnaire during Experiment 1 was it
should have been sent to the Warning group after the warning email. This would have
provided a better statistical evaluation between the Warning Group and the Non-Warning
Group in an ANOVA. However, this was accomplished in Experiment 2 and results
between the two experiments appeared to be relatively the same. This again suggests that
the warning issued may not have increased suspicion to an acceptable level or could
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suggest that the questionnaire used may not have appropriately measured the desired
constructs. It was thought that the Warning Group’s system trust would be lower and
their awareness would be higher than the Non-Warning group. This was not supported
by the responses from the questionnaire items. This suggests that future research is
needed to determine at what level warnings increase suspicion to an acceptable state,
which would induce a change in an individual’s system trust and awareness. It also
appears from the results that several of the items used to measure awareness did not
provide strong indicators for this behavior. The overall findings from the questionnaire
may suggest that better indicators for awareness need to be developed to effectively
evaluate a system trust and awareness relationship. Because no other instruments existed
at the time of this study, it was determined to be the best instrument available.
A final limitation was the use of very benign questions in the email messages.
The email questions did not ask the participants any personal information. This research
was concerned with whether people paid attention to the actual email address they
respond to and not how they would respond to personal-type questions. Future studies
should experiment with the use of more personal type questions to determine if the types
of questions asked could be used as deceptive cues.

Recommendations for Future Research
The findings from this study are encouraging enough to continue this line of
research. The findings from the questionnaire led this researcher to recommend that a
new instrument be developed to study the behavior between system trust and awareness
in information systems. Additional studies are needed to determine if other systems are
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vulnerable to an email forgery information attack. Additional studies are needed to study
what type of relationship warnings (i.e., about possible deception) has on an individual’s
ability to detect deception. These studies could determine how different types of
warnings (i.e., verbal or text) relate to participant’s ability to detect deception. These
studies could look at the delivery or presentation of the message. For example, in textbased warning messages, future research could examine how people respond to bold
colored text messages vs. an ordinary black text message to determine which of these
messages increase suspicion more effectively. Additional studies are also needed to
determine if people deceived by an email forgery show improvement in identifying these
forms of deceptive messages during future manipulations. This would determine if
individuals learn from their past experiences and are better at detecting this form of
manipulation. Future studies could be used to determine how the nature of the questions
asked (i.e., personal questions vs. generic questions) in email forgeries affect a person’s
ability to detect email manipulation. Finally, a longitudinal study is recommended to
determine what affects email forgery has on a person over prolonged periods of time.
Another possible area of research would be to determine how training affects
identity theft in email forgery. This training could be done in several ways. It could be
added to the annual computer security training (COMPUSEC) U.S. Air Force personnel
receive or it could be a separate computer security training package. This opens up two
future research issues to be explored. The first research issue would be to see how
individuals with annual COMPUSEC training, which includes training on identity theft
and email forgery, perform in a similar scenario as used by this experiment. The second
research issue would be to determine how a separate training format devised solely to
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train individuals on identity theft and email forgery performs in a similar scenario as used
by this research. These areas of training should be explored as a possible way of raising
email users’ awareness to the possibility of email forgery.
A final future area of study would be to determine how effective the Common
Access Card’s (i.e., Smart Card or CAC) authentication capability is. In this study,
individuals with authentication capability could be measured against those without
authentication capability. This would determine whether the authentication capability of
the CAC is a solution to the email forgery vulnerability.

Summary
The information age has provided an array of exciting opportunities in technology
and communication. This new computer technology has produced advancement in the
areas of communication, increased productivity, increased efficiency and increased
information processing. However, these benefits are not without their negative impacts,
such as the number of viruses spreading across the World Wide Web and email systems
(Denning, 1999). The increase in frauds and crimes are in direct connection to these
technological advances (Robb, 2002). Email is one of those technological advances in
communication. We have seen email communication grow from less than 100 million
mailboxes before 1996 to over 800 million mailboxes in 2001 (Fontana, 2001). Email
communication will only continue to grow, and with that growth, new vulnerabilities and
threats to email and its users will grow as well. The U.S. Air Force, U.S. Military and
DoD rely heavily on email. U.S. Air Force commanders send orders for their troops to
carry out through email. U.S. Air Force instructors use email as a primary means of
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communication to issue assignments or inform students of class and course changes.
This research looked at a new vulnerability to email systems and showed how easy it can
be to deceive and manipulate individuals with only a small amount of information about
them. The U.S. Air Force and DoD must not become complacent and allow these
vulnerabilities to jeopardize our information superiority over our foes. The U.S. must
stay on the cutting edge of technology, but must also remember that with this technology,
come new vulnerabilities our enemies are more than willing and ready to exploit. This
research identifies one of those new vulnerabilities. Research efforts like this one, which
are designed to seek out new vulnerabilities to our information systems, need to be
continued. The U.S. cannot allow new types of vulnerabilities to go undefended or
unprotected in the future. The use of authentication will reduce the threat of email
forgery. However, people have to be taught to authenticate the email address of the
sender or email forgery will continue to be a vulnerability our enemies will exploit.
Leaders and military organizations need to be aware of what their computer
vulnerabilities are. This research provides empirical evidence that military users are
susceptible to email manipulation.
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Appendix A: Human Subjects Review Board Application
1. Title: Information Manipulation in Electronic Means of Communication
F-WR-2002-0038-H
2. Principal Investigator: Capt Roy V. Rockwell, AFIT/ENV GIR03M, 371-8184,
roy.rockwell@afit.edu
3. AFIT Thesis Advisor: Lt. Col David P. Biros, AF-CIO, DSN: 329-3555 Comm:
(703) 601-3555, david.biros@pentagon.af.mil
4. Medical Monitor: N/A
5. Contractor and/or Facility: N/A
6. Objective: This research will add to the body of knowledge in the computer systems
information assurance research field. It will study the correlations between email system
trust and levels of awareness. It will determine if identity theft through email forgery is a
significant vulnerability the Air Force should be aware of.
a. Hypothesis:
H1: Warnings about possible electronic identity theft will be positively associated
with decreased levels of trust.
H2: Warnings about possible electronic identity theft will be positively associated
with increased levels of awareness.
H3a: Decreased levels of trust will be positively associated with increased levels of
awareness.
H3b: Increased levels of trust will be positively associated with information
manipulation not detected.
H4: Awareness about possible electronic identity theft will be positively associated
with information manipulation detected.
b. Given that identity theft and email forgery is a growing concern in electronic
computer communication, research in this area is needed by the Air Force to
determine the magnitude of this potential computer vulnerability.
7. Impact: It will determine if email forgery is a viable threat to government email
systems and if Air Force personnel are susceptible to this type of vulnerability.
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8. Experimental Plan:
This experiment will measure levels of system trust and awareness of the
AFIT/EN student body using email forgery. The experiment will last a total of 5
weeks. The proposed experiment will consist of several stages:
a. Stage 1 will consist of email sent to the AFIT/EN student body asking 80 students
to voluntarily participate in a study regarding information manipulation in
electronic means of communication. I will ask them to reply to the email if they
wish to participate. Once 80 participants agree, I will set up a designated time for
them to meet with me, review, and sign the informed consent form.
b. Stage 2 will begin once all 80 participants have signed their informed consent
forms. This stage will consist of a survey sent out to the participants, which will
measure levels of system trust and awareness levels to deception. It will also
measure computer security and email experience. This survey will be done via
email from the AFIT Network Operations and Security Center.
c. Stage 3 will consist of splitting the responses at random into two groups. Group 1
will not receive any type of warning regarding identity theft or possible computer
system vulnerabilities. Group 2 will receive a warning email from the AFIT
Network Operations and Security Center regarding possible computer system
vulnerabilities, which involves identity theft and email forgery.
d. Stage 4 will take place approximately one week after Group 2 receives the
warning email. This will consist of five emails from the AFIT Network
Operations and Security Center and one email forgery from what appears to be
the AFIT Network Operations and Security Center, sent to both Groups 1 and 2.
This email forgery will be from a commercial source such as yahoo, hotmail,
att.net or some other commercial resource and disguised to look as if it originated
from the AFIT Network Operations and Security Center. The email forgery will
consist of a question, which requires a response. The question used for the email
forgery will ask the participants to vote yes or no if they think AFIT should
incorporate a wireless Local Area Network when building 640 is renovated. This
would allow students to connect their personal or government issued laptops to
the AFIT network at anytime within the AFIT campus.
e. Stage 6 will be five to ten days after all data has been collected. This email will
originate from the AFIT Network Operations and Security Center and will be a
post-survey, which will measure system trust and awareness levels to be
compared and correlated with the first survey taken. This post survey will ask the
same questions used in the pre-survey with the addition of several questions to
determine if the participants were able to successfully tell which email was a
forgery.
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9. Medical Risk Analysis: There are minimal risks to student participants. Participants
who receive these emails from the AFIT Network Operations and Security Center may
feel anxiety from the increased number of emails they receive. The participants may feel
embarrassed by failing to identify the email forgery. One possible benefit to the
participants would be an increased awareness of this type of vulnerability and way to
identify other possible email forgeries in the future.
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INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
Information Manipulation in Electronic Means of Communication
1. Purpose of Study
This research is being conducted by Roy V. Rockwell, Captain,
USAF, and a graduate student in Information Resource Management at the
Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT). Lt Col David P. Biros is
overseeing this research for the Air Force Office of Scientific Research. I
understand the purpose of the research project is to better understand
information manipulation in electronic means of communication. I
understand that if I participate in the project, I may be asked questions
about my levels of trust and awareness placed in government computer
systems. There will be approximately 80 Subjects.
2. Procedures
a. This experiment will measure levels of system trust and
awareness of subjects using an email system. The experiment will last a
total of 5 weeks. The experiment will consist of six to nine stages, each of
which is an email form requesting information. Some messages may
originate from outside military channels and should be handled according
to applicable regulations. I will also take two surveys, consisting of 15-20
questions. At the conclusion of the research, I will be debriefed on the
results of the experiment by the investigator.
3. Risks and Inconveniences
a. There are no known risks to me. All my answers to the survey
questions will be kept confidential and identified by a subject code
number. My name will not appear on any of the results. I understand
there will be no retribution of any form from the Air Force, AFIT, or any
other agencies involved in this study concerning the responses made by
the participants. No individual responses will be reported. Only
aggregate findings will be reported.
4. Benefits
a. There is no direct benefit to me for participation in this research.
b. I understand that the Air Force may gain valuable information
on the vulnerabilities of government computer systems.
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5. Alternatives
Choosing not to participate is an alternative to participating in this study.
6. Entitlements and Confidentiality
I understand that this consent may be withdrawn at any time without
prejudice, penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled.
The decision to participate in this research is completely voluntary on my
part. No one has coerced or intimidated me into participating in this
program. I am participating because I want to. Capt. Roy V. Rockwell,
(AFIT, School of Engineering and Management, Phone: (937) 255-3636
ext 6459, Email: roy.rockwell@afit.edu, Cell Phone: 937-371-8184) has
adequately answered any and all questions I have about this study, my
participation, and the procedures involved. Capt Rockwell will be
available to answer questions during the study.

(Investigator)
(Subject)

(Witness)
Privacy Act Statement
Authority: We are requesting disclosure of personal information, to include
your Social Security Number. Researchers are authorized to collect personal information
(including social security numbers) on research subjects under The Privacy Act-5 USC
552a, 10 USC 55, 10 USC 8013, 32 CFR Part 219, 45 CFR Part 46, and EO 9397,
November 1943 (SSN).
Purpose: It is possible that latent risks or injuries inherent in this experiment
will not be discovered until some time in the future. The purpose of collecting this
information is to aid researchers in locating you at a future date if further disclosures are
appropriate.
Routine Uses: Information (including name and SSN) may be furnished to
Federal, State and local agencies for any uses published by the Air Force in the Federal
Register, 52 FR 16431, to include, furtherance of the research involved with this study
and to provide medical care.
Disclosure: Disclosure of the requested information is voluntary. No adverse
action whatsoever will be taken against you, and no privilege will be denied you based on
the fact you do not disclose this information. However, your participation in this study
may be impacted by a refusal to provide this information.
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Appendix B: Warning Email
Subject
Stay alert for fraudulent email messages.
Message
During the past several weeks the AFIT Network Operations and Security Center has seen an
increase in the attempt to gather information on military individuals. The process has been to
disguise the email address so that it looks like it has come from a legitimate source when it is
really coming from some fraudulent source. AFIT students need to be aware of this type of
fraudulent activity and be alert to these types of threats. These attempts for information cannot
be filtered out by the Network Operations and Security Center until they are brought to our
attention, by someone such as you. So please be alert!!!
An example of one such attempt was sent to you by Capt. Lacey several weeks ago. It is
attached below.
Attention All:
The following message appears to be an attempt to gather HUMINT from
unsuspecting users. Two things make this message suspicious, the TO
field is not visible and the FROM address is a yahoo.com address... not
one a business like SAIC should be using.
DO NOT respond to this e-mail.
hoax, but be safe.

We have no confirmation that it is a

Be vigilant!
Maj(s) Tim Lacey
Deputy Director
AFIT/SCB
-----Original Message----From: SAIC_Korea@yahoo.com
Sent: 7/16/2002 10:19 AM
Subject: Cleared Opportunities in South Korea with SAIC
Cleared Opportunities in South Korea with SAIC
Company: SAIC
Website: www.saic.com
Overview: A diversified high-technology research and engineering
company based in San Diego, California, Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) offers a broad range of
expertise in technology development and analysis, computer system
development and integration, technical support services, and
computer hardware and software products. SAIC engineers and
scientists work to solve complex technical problems in national
security, homeland defense, energy, the environment,
telecommunications, health care and transportation.
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FOR ALL POSITIONS:

-------This Message Ends for space savings----------

Tim Fox
AFIT/SCBY
Chief, Support Branch
Information Systems Division
Communications and Information Directorate
Air Force Institute of Technology
(937-255-6565 x4265)
(DSN 785-6565 x4265)
Tim.Fox@afit.edu
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Appendix C: In-Text Message Manipulation for Experiment 2
Signature block used in legitimate email messages:

Tim Fox
AFIT/SCBY
Chief, Support Branch
Information Systems Division
Communications and Information Directorate
Air Force Institute of Technology
(937-255-6565 x4265)
(DSN 785-6565 x4265)
Tim.Fox@afit.edu

Signature block used manipulation in email forgeries:
Tim Fox
AFIT Network Operations and Security Center
Chief, Support Branch
Information Systems Division
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